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Town Meeting



BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR

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Should the Veto Be Abolished in the United Nations?

Moderator, GEORGE V. DENNY, JR.

Speakers

NORMAN J. O. MAKIN

ADLAI STEVENSON

Interrogators

LOUIS FISCHER

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

(See also page 15)

COMING

—November 21, 1946—

How Can We Avoid a Depression?

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THE BROADCAST FOR NOVEMBER 14:

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THE BROADCAST FOR NOVEMBER 21:

"How Can We Avoid a Depression?"

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Town Meeting



BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR

GEORGE V. DENNY, JR., MODERATOR



NOVEMBER 14, 1946

VOL. 12, No. 29

Should the Veto Be Abolished in the United States?

Announcer:

Welcome, friends, to Town Hall, New York, home of the Nation's most popular radio forum, America's Town Meeting of the Air. Today the General Assembly of the United Nations, meeting at Lake Success, New York, heard an important denunciation of the veto power in the United Nations Charter.

Tonight your Town Meeting brings you a discussion of this question, in which the principal speakers will be the Honorable Norman J. O. Makin, Australian Ambassador to the United States, and Mr. Adlai Stevenson, alternate United States delegate to the United Nations General Assembly.

Now, here to preside over our meeting is the founder of America's Town Meeting, the president of Town Hall, Mr. George V. Denny, Jr. Mr. Denny. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Denny:

Good evening, neighbors. In June of 1945, your Town Meeting considered tonight's question when the inclusion of the Big Five veto power was being debated at San Francisco. Captain Harold Stassen, Senator Styles Bridges, and Journalists Marquis Childs and Kenneth Crawford were our speakers.

A year and four months after the adoption of the charter, we now consider the Big Five veto power again in the light of the persistent protests of the small nations and many individuals.

I wish that all of you could read and study the United Nations charter. Incidentally, if you haven't a copy, you can get one in a handy pocket-sized edition by sending ten cents to the American Association for the United Nations at 45 East 65th Street, New York—that's 45 East 65th Street, New

York—for it would help all of us in our thinking about the world organization.

Now the stated purpose in the United Nations charter—the first stated purpose — is to maintain international peace and security. I'm sure the framers of this charter do not believe that they were drawing up a perfect document and will not question the wisdom of a constant examination of how it is working in line with its stated purposes.

In the light of our brief experience with the Big Five veto power, we're entitled to ask if this highly debatable provision has advanced the stated purposes and principles of the charter as set forth in Chapter I, Article I.

What is referred to as the Big Five veto power is contained in Article 27, which covers voting procedure for the Security Council and reads as follows:

Section I: Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

Section II: The decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members, provided that in decisions under Chapter 6, and Paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Mr. Fischer, as a journalist, I would like to ask you and Dr.

Schuman, as our special interrogators tonight, if you can agree on a simple journalistic statement as to just what this language means? Mr. Fischer? (*Applause.*)

Mr. Fischer: In the United Nations organization, the Security Council is the only body that can take action for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council consists of eleven members — the Big Five permanent members, the Big Powers; that is, the United States, Russia, England, France, and China — and six smaller powers who are chosen for one or two years. At present, these temporary members are Australia, Egypt, Poland, Holland, Mexico, and Brazil.

To pass a decision, at least seven members of the Security Council must vote for it. If the decision involves questions of procedure, say, whether a topic should or should not be discussed, any seven votes will pass a motion, but when it comes to the maintenance or enforcement of peace, all five Big Powers must vote for action; otherwise, there is no action.

If one Big Power does not vote "yes" there can be no action. That Big Power will then be exercising its veto. When there is a majority of seven or more, and when this majority is defeated by one Great Power, that is a veto.

Moderator Denny: Thank you,

Mr. Fischer. Dr. Schuman, do you agree to that definition?

Dr. Schuman: It seems to me, Mr. Denny, that Mr. Fischer's statement is quite fair and accurate both substantively and procedurally.

Moderator Denny: You got that in. Dr. Schuman, also in the realm of facts and not of arguments, will you tell us briefly on what occasions the veto power has actually been used during the past year.

Dr. Schuman: The question of the use of the veto was first posed last January and February at the first meeting of the Security Council with Mr. Makin presiding. The formal or technical vetos were as follows:

On February 16, the Soviet Union vetoed a resolution on the withdrawal of British and French troops from Lebanon and Syria.

On June 19, Mr. Gromyko vetoed a resolution to refer the question of a diplomatic rupture with Franco to the General Assembly. This followed three earlier votes on the Spanish issue, each involving the use of the veto by the Soviet Union.

August 29 was a red-letter day in the use of the veto. On that day the Soviet Union vetoed motions to admit as new members to the United Nations, Portugal, Transjordan, and Ireland, after United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands had voted against

motions to admit Albania and Mongolia.

More recently, early in September, the Soviet Union vetoed a motion for an inquiry into the Ukrainian charges against Greece.

In addition to these instances, there have been other cases of threatened use of the veto, and virtual vetoes by various powers without a formal vote.

Moderator Denny:

Thank you, Dr. Schuman. Well, we're very glad to have those facts before us. Now, we come to the arguments for the affirmative. We're happy at this time to present His Excellency, the Honorable Ambassador from Australia and delegate to the United Nations General Assembly, who was president of the Security Council last year when it met in London, Mr. Norman J. Makin. Ambassador Makin. (*Applause.*)

Ambassador Makin:

I'm sure that I emphasize the overwhelming feeling of peoples of the world when I declare that they are looking to the United Nations to prevent another war.

Australia and a lot of other countries believe that as long as the veto is retained in its present form, the United Nations won't be able to work effectively. If that's true, if the veto is stopping the United Nations from doing its job, then the veto must be altered or abolished.

The San Francisco Conference set up the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. On that Council, five nations have permanent seats—China, France, Great Britain, the United States, and Soviet Russia. They were given that privilege because of their strength and importance. Everyone agreed to that. The other six members of the Council are elected for two-year terms by the 54 nations.

The point I want to make is that the five great powers are in a better position to protect their interests than the smaller powers because they are always members of the Security Council. But the Big Five asked for another special privilege. They said, "We can't be bound by any decisions of the Security Council that we don't agree with. We must have special rights when it comes to voting."

And they asked that when a vote was being taken, seven members must vote in favor, including all permanent members. They hinted—I nearly was going to say threatened—that if they weren't given this special privilege they wouldn't accept the charter at all. The argument they used was that there must be unanimity among the great powers. Otherwise, the United Nations won't work.

You may remember that the Australian delegation led by Dr. Evatt fought hard to keep the veto

within reasonable bounds. We agreed that, as things then stood, all the Big Powers would have to be unanimous if it was a question of using sanctions or armed force against an aggressor. But we didn't see that a veto was necessary, where the Council was trying to settle a dispute by peaceful means.

Suppose, for example, two small countries had differences of opinion about their frontier. Suppose one of the members of the Security Council had suggested that the two parties to the dispute should submit their claims to arbitration. We couldn't, for the life of us, see why one of the Big Powers who happened to disagree should be able to prevent the Council urging the appointment of umpires. It just didn't make sense to us.

The two kinds of action which the Council might take were clearly distinguished in the charter. Chapter VI sets out what the Council could do for pacific settlements of disputes where there was a dispute or a situation which might endanger peace but not an actual breach of the peace had occurred. In that kind of a case, the Council would simply make recommendations to the parties, suggest arbitration or some other method.

Chapter VII sets out what the Council could do where an actual threat to the peace and the breach of the peace or an act of aggres-

sion had occurred. In these serious cases, the Council could call on the members of the United Nations to use economic sanctions or even armed force.

Most of the smaller powers agreed with Australia that the veto should apply only where enforcement measures were to be taken.

Most countries also agreed that even if the veto was given to the Big Five as a temporary expedient, it should be possible to revise the charter from time to time. Then, if the veto wasn't working well, the charter could be amended.

The Big Five insisted, however, that they should have the right to veto any amendment. In other words, they can veto any attempt to abolish the veto.

In the end, although a large majority of the San Francisco Conference were opposed to the veto provisions, we were forced to accept them. It was, as the New Zealand Minister in Washington put it the other day, "a shotgun wedding." The unwilling bridegroom has been unhappy ever since and to make matters worse, the bride's parents can veto a divorce. (*Laughter.*)

Well, now, how has the veto worked out in practice. In spite of the defects in the charter, the Security Council might still have done a reasonably good job if all the Big Powers had played the game.

Before the charter was signed the four countries who sent out the invitations to the San Francisco Conference made certain promises. They said that they would use the veto sparingly. They would not use it in an arbitrary way to obstruct the proceedings of the Council. They would use it only where a decision had to be taken which might lead to enforcement measures.

But experience over the last ten months has shown that the veto does not automatically ensure unanimity. Far from it. It has led to endless wrangles in the Security Council. It has been used, not where the Council was considering the application of sanctions, but in most cases to prevent action by the Council for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The veto has also been used to block a recommendation by the Council for the admission of new members to the United Nations. I don't want to discuss the merits of any particular country tonight, but I don't see why any one country should be able to prevent Ireland or Portugal or Transjordan from joining the United Nations if they want to.

How would you like to be stopped from joining a club because one of the 11 members of the Board wasn't on speaking terms with you?

Australian Minister, Dr. Evatt, summed up the situation a few

days ago like this: "The Security Council," he said, "is in the appalling position that nothing may be done about a dispute which has come before the organization. From the beginning you know that nothing can be done about it. Bitter speeches are made this or that way and you are always conscious of the threat that at the end the next business will be called and no recommendation or suggestion can be made for the Council."

I think you'll agree that there's something wrong with a system that produces these results and what are they going to do about it? Some countries have suggested that the charter should be amended immediately to eliminate or to modify the veto. One difficulty about this is, as I have mentioned earlier, that amendments to the charter must be ratified by two-thirds of the members, including all of the permanent members of the Security Council. Unless all the Big Five are agreeable, amendment is impossible.

Australia thinks it's too early in the history of the organization to attempt to revise the charter, and I think Mr. Stevenson would agree with that, but there is another way in which we think that this can be achieved.

We feel that the permanent members of the Security Council can make the charter work if they are really prepared to co-operate.

They can exercise restraint in the use of the veto.

They can work out rules of procedure to define the cases in which it will apply.

They can reach solutions in a spirit of compromise.

To make clear to the Big Five how the nations feel on this matter, the Australian delegation raised the matter in the General Assembly, the Town Meeting of the World, in which each country has a vote. This morning we moved a resolution requesting the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from exercising their power of veto, except in cases under Chapter 7 of the charter; that is, in cases requiring enforcement measures.

If the permanent members sincerely strive for unanimity, the veto may fall completely into disuse and its formal elimination would follow as a matter of course.

If, on the other hand, any permanent members continue to use the veto in an arbitrary manner, public opinion of the world would, I feel confident, be so aroused that the eventual abolition of the veto in the United Nations would be equally certain. The great powers insisted on having the veto in the interest of unanimity. They must use it for that purpose or surrender the privilege. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Denny:

Thank you, Ambassador Makin. Now, it's our privilege to hear

from Mr. Adlai Stevenson, alternate United States delegate to the United Nations General Assembly, and former special assistant to the Secretary of Navy and the Secretary of War. Mr. Stevenson is also, by profession, a Chicago lawyer. Mr. Stevenson. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Stevenson:

Mr. Denny, you know that in these international conferences we never refer to each other as Mister or as Ambassador. We always refer to each other as distinguished colleague. Now, my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Makin, is also my very good friend with whom I have worked over a period of time, and I'm happy to be able to reassure my audience this evening that this is almost the first time, indeed, I will say it's the first time that he's ever been wrong. (*Laughter.*)

But after listening to his eloquent address, I'm not so sure that we're very far apart after all. However, he did intimate, I believe, that the United Nations cannot function effectively until the veto is abolished.

I hold, on the other hand, that the United Nations cannot function effectively if it is abolished. Our disagreement on this point reminds me of that old saw about married men and their wives: If they can't get along with their mates, neither can they get along without them.

Instead of going to the divorce courts and engaging in a legal battle which will never produce the solution of this veto problem, I suggest we sit down around the table and try to work out a way to permit the use, but not the abuse, of the veto in the United Nations.

First, let me make one thing absolutely clear. The veto itself is not the basic cause of our difficulties. It is only a reflection of the unfortunate and deep-seated differences with the Russians. If we are to escape from the atmosphere of crisis that surrounds our international relations, we must settle these differences. Merely changing the voting formula will never be enough.

In discussing this subject, it will help us to recall that there are three types of situations in which the so-called veto may possibly be used. It may be used, first, in the case where the Security Council is about to take action to maintain peace by the use of force.

Second, it may be used when the Council is trying to settle a dispute by peaceful means.

And third, it may be used in voting on what is really only a question of procedure, or how to do business. It will be helpful if, while I am speaking, these distinctions may be borne in mind.

The whole issue of the veto, the rule of unanimity, which I suggest is a more proper term, was thor-

oughly thrashed out at the San Francisco conference a year ago, as my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Makin, has indicated. At that time the smaller states, participating in the conference, including Australia, argued the case against the unanimity rule with great force and cogency.

The unanimity rule grew out, I submit, grew out of the facts of international political life. It is a fact that effective military and economic power in the world today is largely concentrated in the hands of five great states. They must carry the burden of enforcing measures to keep the peace. If those states are in agreement, there will be no major war and an organization designed to keep the peace will be able to do so because of the preponderant power which can be mobilized to support its decisions.

But if the Big Five disagree on a matter involving their vital interests, the application of force against any of them, or for that matter, against any state over the determined opposition of any one of them will produce a major war. This is the very thing that the United Nations was created to prevent.

Thus, under present circumstances, an effective world organization could not exist and grow, unless it was founded on the agreement of the great powers. At San Francisco, these powers were not

prepared to agree to support an organization which could take, without their consent, important decisions on matters affecting their vital interests. For example, an organization that could order American troops into action without our consent.

The unanimity rule is the price we have to pay for any effective organization. But please bear this in mind, the existence of the rule does not put any member of the United Nations, large or small, above the law, as some people say. All the members are bound equally by the provisions of the charter, including the provisions requiring member states to settle their disputes by a peaceful means, and to refrain from the threat or the use of force. That affects the big powers, binds the big powers, as well as the small.

Everyone blames the Russians it seems for difficulties which have arisen in the Security Council in connection with the unanimity rule.

Certainly I can't condone abuse of the veto. But let us not forget that we, the United States, no less than the Russians, insisted on putting it into the charter. It definitely helped to secure approval of the charter of the United Nations in the United States Senate by the overwhelming favorable vote of 89 to 2.

The argument over the veto has become so intense that we sometimes distort the extent and sig-

nificance. It does not paralyze the United Nations, or make effective action impossible. There is no veto in the United Nations General Assembly, in the economic and Social Council, in the Trusteeship Council, or other United Nations instrumentalities. In these organs, decisions are taken by majorities of various types.

It is only in the Security Council, and then principally in connection with decisions related to the maintenance of international peace and security — decisions which may either immediately, or in the long run, involve the use of armed forces of the great powers—that the unanimity rule is required by the charter.

Compared with the League of Nations where, as a rule, every member had the right of veto in such cases, this represents very real progress indeed toward the organization of a true international community.

We must also remember that issues are sometimes settled not only by what goes on in the Security Council, but by what happens after a case has been brought before it. For example, the French and the British speedily agreed with Syria and the Lebanon to withdraw their troops from those countries, even though a veto prevented a decision by the Council. Russia withdrew her forces from Iran, even though Mr. Gromyko walked out of the Council discussions on that matter.

There has been a good deal of criticism of the use of the veto in the Security Council on matters which do not directly involve the use of the enforcement measures. Under the charter, members of the United Nations confer on the Security Council primary responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. Once the Council has embarked on this task in any particular case, it is always possible that a chain of events will be initiated which will lead, in the last analysis, to enforcement action.

As soon as the Council agrees to take any action on a case beyond mere discussion, it must be prepared for enforcement action when the chips are down.

Nevertheless, the United States hopes that the five permanent members of the Security Council may sometime agree upon modification of the unanimity rule, so that it becomes easier to settle disputes peacefully. We feel that necessary action by the Security Council for the peaceful settlement of a dispute should never be prevented by the votes of any one or any number of its members.

The permanent member should exercise self-restraint, so that necessary action is never blocked in this way. We do not pretend that we have been satisfied with the operation of the unanimity rule in the Security Council to date. We do not think it has al-

ways been used sparingly, been used with restraint and self-discipline in the true spirit of the charter, as the San Francisco declaration of the great powers indicated it should be used. We condemn the attempt to use it to circumvent the provisions of the charter, but to argue from this premise that the rule should therefore be abolished would be as the French say, "To throw out the baby with the bath."

Under present circumstances, abolishing the veto would probably mean abolishing the organization. Instead of running that risk, it would be wise for the Security Council itself to clarify the practices surrounding the operation of the unanimity rule. This could be done, for example, by writing into the Security Council's rules of procedure, definite statements as to what matters are not subject to the unanimity rule. It could be done by establishing precedence in the Security Council which would tend to set up a limit to the kinds of matters to which the unanimity rule would apply.

Such a course may seem intolerably slow, but it is better to move slowly, it is better to seek unanimity of the great powers through methods of persuasion, than it is to break that unanimity with a shock that would probably shatter the organization itself. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Denny:

Thank you, Mr. Stevenson. Indeed there is wide area of agreement between you and Ambassador Makin, and I expect, there is more difference of opinion between our special interrogators.

Our first special interrogator has just published a very widely praised book called *The Great Challenge*, which Mr. Sumner Welles has said will never be dated. I understand Mr. Fischer is going to challenge Mr. Stevenson's position on tonight's question, as well as that maintained by the United States delegation of which he is a member. Mr. Louis Fischer, journalist and foreign correspondent. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Fischer: I think the question of the veto sounds complicated, but is actually more simple. The veto means that in the Security Council of eleven, one is more than ten. That is the arithmetic of dictatorship. That is dictatorship by a minority, by a minority of one. The Security Council is a jury of eleven. Ten vote to punish the criminal, but the eleventh, who is the criminal himself, votes no, and so the criminal goes unpunished.

That is the meaning of sovereignty. If I am sovereign, it means that the policemen cannot arrest me. A sovereign is above the law, and as long as we maintain the sovereignty of nations, then the nations, at least the big ones, are

above the law, and then there is no law. The choice that faces humanity in this Atomic Age is law or war.

Former Justice Owen J. Roberts was quoted in today's *New York Herald Tribune* as saying, "Let's cut out the sovereignty stuff which is nothing more than a cover for burglary." With sovereignty you have no law and therefore you have crime. In international affairs, the crime is war.

Now everybody here, I believe, thinks that the veto should go, but some say, "Take your time. It's too early to abolish the veto." That assumes that we have a lot of time, but I think that the erasing of space results in the erasing of time, too. When we are packed so closely together in the air power and atomic power world, there is no time to wait for a crisis. You have to act before the crisis.

Now people say the veto reflects the present world situation. Well, that's just the trouble. The present world situation is bad and could result in war. I want the veto abolished so that the world situation can be improved. The abolition of the veto would be the first step towards world government, and world government is the only road to peace. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Now, Mr. Fischer, your questions for Mr. Stevenson.

Mr. Fischer: Mr. Stevenson, you said that the success of the United Nations organization always de-

pends on the unanimity of the Big Five, and, unless they agree, then there's no hope. Now we've seen through the short experience of the U.N., that the Big Five frequently don't agree. That means that in a crisis, which might mean war, they might not agree. What are you going to do about that in advance?

Mr. Stevenson: I take it Mr. Fischer's question is what are we going to do in advance in the event that the Big Five can't agree in the Security Council?

Well, of course, it is implicit in our discussion that the possibility of a disagreement always will persist. What I say is that we can't foretell disagreement. We can foretell the certainty of misfortune, perhaps of the destruction of this organization, until we have had both the time and the experience in which we have learned to live together and work together in the United Nations.

Mr. Fischer: This means — or may I rather not interpret Mr. Stevenson but I give you as my own opinion—this means that if the U.N. is faced with a crisis, which may end in war, U.N. may cease to exist. That is, the first time the U.N. meets the problem of war—and that is the problem for which it was created—it may cease to exist. It may die. It may blow up. Now what I say is, if you know that that is a possibility, do something in advance

now, by modifying the U.N. charter. (Applause.)

Mr. Stevenson: If your alternative was modifying the U.N. charter, by abolishing the veto, you might have a very, very sound program. My suggestion is that your alternative is abolishing the veto and abolishing the United Nations Charter. (Applause.)

Mr. Denny: Now, I think we have come to a point where we ought to hear the analysis by Dr. Schuman, who more or less supports Mr. Stevenson in this interesting discussion, and now we are going to hear from the professor of political science at Williams College, author of *Soviet Politics At Home and Abroad*, Dr. Frederick L. Schuman. Dr. Schuman. (Applause.)

Dr. Schuman: You already see that there is very little danger of agreement here tonight. I am delighted, however, to hear that our distinguished guest, Ambassador Makin, does not really believe, after all, that the veto should be abolished, or can be abolished. That the veto cannot be abolished is fortunate because its abolition would wreck the United Nations organization and destroy any possibility of its evolving into the world government, which we must have if we are to survive in the Atomic Age.

The abolition of the veto, were it possible, and happily it is not, would destroy the United Nations

organization, because the basic principle of the charter, as Mr. Stevenson has said, is the principle of the unanimity of the great powers in all substantive decisions and in all decisions to use force to keep the peace. The great powers can be unanimous only if each is free to prevent action by the others if it disapproves of the action proposed.

Most of our confusion, it seems to me, over the veto springs from the false notion which is a relic of the League of Nations unhappily revived in Mr. Baruch's proposals for international control of atomic energy that peace can be kept by the punishment of sovereign states. That this notion is false is revealed by all past human experience.

It's falsity was fully realized by the Founding Fathers of the United States of America. James Madison declared that the punishment of states, as a means of keeping the peace, was visionary and fallacious and would be regarded as a declaration of war.

Alexander Hamilton said, "To coerce states is one of the maddest projects that was ever devised. The thing is a dream, it is impossible, it amounts to a war between the parties."

Now there are two alternatives to the punishment of states as a means of keeping the peace. One is the unanimity of the great pow-

ers with each having a veto on any punishment of states, and at present that is necessary. The other is legislation on a world scale enforceable on individuals. It is only in that way, I feel confident, that we shall arrive at world government. Therefore, I

should like to put to Mr. Makin this question—

Mr. Denny: Dr. Schuman, would you hold on to that question until after we pause briefly for station identification.

Dr. Schuman: I'd be glad to, Mr. Denny.

THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

NORMAN JOHN OSWALD MAKIN—Mr. Makin has been Australian Ambassador to the United States since September of this year. He is also a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly. Born in Petersham, New South Wales, in 1889, Mr. Makin attended Superior Public School at Broken Hill. He has been a member of the Commonwealth Parliament for Hindmarsh since 1919. He has been a member of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and chairman of Committees. From 1929 to 1932 he was Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the Commonwealth of Australia. In 1940 he was a member of the Advisory War Council.

In 1936, Mr. Makin was president of the Labour Party, and in 1931, he was secretary of the Federal Parliamentary Labour Party. He was a member of the delegation sent to England for the King George V Jubilee in 1935 and to the Coronation of King George VI in 1937. In 1941 he was made Minister for Navy and Munitions for Australia.

ADLAI EWING STEVENSON—Mr. Stevenson, an attorney, was formerly a special assistant to the Secretary of State and is now the alternate United States delegate to the United Nations General Assembly. Mr. Stevenson was also formerly the United States delegate and United States Minister to the preparatory commission of the United Nations in London.

Born in Los Angeles, California, Mr. Stevenson received an A.B. degree from Princeton, and a J.D. degree from Northwestern University. For one year he was assistant managing editor of the *Daily Pantagraph*, at Bloomington, Illinois. Admitted to the Illinois bar in 1926, he became associated with the law firm of Cutting, Moore & Sidley in Chicago. In 1933 and 1934 he was in Washington, D.C., as special counsel for the AAA and assistant general counsel for the Federal Alcohol Control Administration.

From 1935 to 1941, he was connected

with the law firm of Sidley, Austin, Burgess & Harper in Chicago. Then from 1941 to 1944, back in Washington, he was special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. During this time he was also chief of the Foreign Economic Administration of the Italy Mission in 1943, and the War Department Mission to Europe in 1944. In 1945, he was a special assistant to the Secretary of State.

LOUIS FISCHER—Mr. Fischer, author, lecturer, and foreign correspondent, after his graduation from the Philadelphia School of Pedagogy in 1916, was a teacher in the Philadelphia public schools. His career as a foreign correspondent began in 1921 when he was a contributor to the *New York Evening Post* from Berlin. Since his first trip to Russia in 1922, he has specialized in the study of the Soviet Republic and of European politics. Since 1936, he has traveled and studied extensively in Spain. Mr. Fischer is the author of many books on foreign affairs. His latest book, *The Great Challenge*, is a sequel to *Men and Politics*.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN—Dr. Schuman was born in Chicago in 1904. In 1924, he was granted a Ph.B. degree from the University of Chicago and in 1927, a Ph.D. degree from the same university. For nine years, he served as instructor and assistant professor of political science at his alma mater. Since 1936, he has been professor of political science at Williams College, and Woodrow Wilson professor of government since July 1, 1938. During the war he was a political analyst in the foreign broadcast intelligence service of the Federal Communications Commission. As a lecturer, author, and contributor to magazines, Dr. Schuman is an authority on European affairs. His most recent books include *The Nazi Dictatorship*, *Germany Since 1918*, *Europe on the Eve*, *Night Over Europe*, and *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad*.

Announcer: Friends, you are listening to America's Town Meeting of the Air, coming to you from Town Hall, New York, where we are discussing the subject, "Should the Veto Be Abolished in the United Nations?"

For your convenience, a copy of tonight's discussion is printed in a small pocket-size pamphlet which you may receive by sending your request to Town Hall, New York 18, New York.

If you would like to have these Town Meeting Bulletins come to you regularly each week, enclose \$1 for 11 weeks, \$2.35 for six months, or \$4.50 for an entire year. And now here again is our moderator, Mr. Denny. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Here is Dr. Schuman who is about to ask a question of Ambassador Makin.

Dr. Schuman: Mr. Denny won't permit you to do what I am about to do, but I want to preface my question with a few more sentences. It seems to me that we can talk sense about abolishing the veto when we stop talking nonsense about punishing states. We can make a beginning of abolishing the veto when we entrust global lawmaking authority, at first in the field of atomic energy, to the United Nations organization.

We can abolish the veto, finally, when we have a democratic world parliament representing people as equal and not states as equal.

Therefore, my question to Mr. Makin is this: Does he oppose the veto because he favors the punishment of states as the means of keeping the peace, or because he hopes that this will help to transform the United Nations organization into a world federal parliament authorized to enact statutes enforceable on individuals all over the globe?

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Dr. Schuman. Mr. Ambassador, these fellows have a way of asking \$25 questions all right. Will you step right up?

Ambassador Makin: That's a \$64 one right there. (*Laughter.*)

Mr. Denny: I see that you listen to the American radio.

Ambassador Makin: There's no doubt about that. I would like to say that I don't accept either of the suggestions that have been made by Dr. Schuman. I feel that there is no question which cannot be actually resolved by conciliation if the nations are prompted with an earnest desire to serve the peace.

I feel that the idea of world government is somewhat in the distance and, therefore, there is need for an immediate modification of the way in which the veto is used so that it will not interfere with the pacific settlement of disputes and shall only apply in regard to the question of enforcement.

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

Mr. Denny: Now, Mr. Truman—Mr. Schuman (*laughter*), oh boy, that was a break. Dr. Schuman—I'd better put that "doctor" in front of it and I'll get his name right. Dr. Schuman has yielded his right to ask questions to this audience here. Since we have been offering a \$25 United States Savings Bond—you understand it will be worth \$25 ten years from now, but it's worth \$18.75 right now—we've noticed some improvement in questions from our audience, but we still have trouble keeping the questions down to 25 words. Now I wonder if I could get away with it if I asked you to give a \$25 United States Saving Bond to your favorite charity if your question goes over 25 words. (*Laughter.*) I hope the audience approves.

Seriously, try to keep them within 25 words for our committee of judges which presents this bond to the person asking the question which, in the committee's opinion, does most, among those asked, to bring out new facts and broaden the scope of this discussion. We make this award only if the question is limited to 25 words. We'll start with the young man down there. Yes?

Man: Mr. Stevenson. Hasn't the double veto, whereby permanent members are able to veto whether the question is procedural or sub-

stantive, given them, in effect, an unlimited veto?

Mr. Stevenson: Well, I don't know about the "unlimited," but if you're complaining about the right of permanent members to veto determination as to whether questions before the Council are substantive or procedural in character, and therefore, are subject to the veto or not subject to the veto, I heartily agree with you. It's entirely wrong. We don't condone the abuse of the veto as I attempted to say most emphatically in my formal remarks. We hope that the time will come soon when by enlarging the definition of those types of questions before the Security Council which require only a procedural vote, we can eliminate this character of abuse.

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Mr. Stevenson, we seem to be making real progress. Mr. Fischer?

Mr. Fischer: That's fine. Mr. Stevenson wants to limit the veto but may I ask Mr. Stevenson this. Why should any power that is peace-loving desire to limit the veto on its participation in action against an aggressor?

Mr. Denny: Mr. Stevenson, did you get that?

Mr. Fischer: Let me put it this way. Let's say France has committed an act of aggression. I take it purely as a mechanical illustration. Why should the United

States use the veto and prevent itself from participating in the punishment of France? Why shouldn't that be automatic. Why shouldn't France know in advance that the United States will automatically punish it if it commits an act of aggression? That's going to deter France.

Mr. Stevenson: Well, I'm slightly confused by the question. I gathered that what Mr. Fischer said was why should the United States use the veto to prevent punishing France in the cited case. I assume that what he meant was why should France be able to use the veto to prevent the United States from punishing France.

Mr. Fischer: No. No. Let me try to make this simple and clear.

Mr. Denny: Let's take Iceland.

Mr. Fischer: Well, let's keep France for a moment.

Mr. Denny: All right.

Mr. Fischer: France has invaded Italy. The question of sanctions against France is up before the U.N. Security Council. The United States can exercise the right of veto because it does not want to participate in sanctions against France. Now I would say the United States should not have the veto in that case because the United States should automatically be involved in sanctions against France. France will know that and France may, therefore, be deterred. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Dr. Schuman, will you tackle that?

Dr. Schuman: Well, you see, ladies and gentlemen, that my good friend Louis Fischer here is still revolving around inside a fallacy. The fallacy is that you can keep the peace by the armed coercion of great powers on the part of other great powers. This is utterly false. There is no way in this world of nations to keep the peace in that way. It has never been done, it cannot be done and that principle was repudiated by the framers of the San Francisco Charter.

Now, if I may come back to the original question—I do feel that deserves a further comment—I do feel it is not quite accurate to speak of an abuse of the charter when the veto power is exercised in a question involving the issue of whether an issue is substantive or procedural. The four great powers that invited the other delegates to San Francisco, including the United States, issued an interpretation on the seventh of June, 1945, in which they agreed among themselves, and this was accepted by the other states there represented, that "the decision" I'm quoting now—"the decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not a matter is procedural, must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent

members." But it was agreed, you see, at San Francisco, that the veto does apply there, too.

Mr. Fischer: Mr. Denny.

Mr. Denny: Mr. Fischer. I knew this would happen.

Mr. Fischer: Dr. Schuman says that sovereign nations will not be deterred by the possibility of collective action against them. How does he know? It's never been tried. The League of Nations, I would say—I would follow the foreign policy of Maxim Litvinoff, the former Soviet Foreign Commissar, who said, "Let us serve notice on all nations, in advance, that if one of them commits an act of aggression, all the others will immediately pounce on it." I think that might stop that nation from going to war. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Mr. Stevenson. I think Mr. Fischer's made his point pretty clear now.

Mr. Stevenson: Mr. Fischer has stated boldly an assumption. I would like to point out to him that perhaps he's in error. At least he's overlooked one very specific article of the charter known as Article 51. It says that in the event that an aggressor attacks a member state, that there is nothing in the charter which restricts the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.

I haven't got the slightest doubt that that constitutes a very considerable deterrent to all nations who are bent on aggression against

fellow members of the United Nations. If they know now, as they do, that if they aggress, if they violate their solemn oath that they have taken in executing this charter, their solemn undertaking to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not in danger, if they violate that covenant and do attack a fellow member state, all of the other members of the United Nations are not forbidden to take action merely because this state exercises its veto in the Security Council. On the contrary, they specifically have the right to take collective action to prevent such aggression. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Mr. Stevenson. Both Mr. Fischer and Dr. Schuman are ready to comment on this but I want to take some more questions from the audience. The young man out there.

Man: I'd like to ask Ambassador Makin, if he were Mr. Molotov— (*Laughter.*)

Mr. Denny: That's a difficult assumption but go ahead.

Man: —remembering the rest of Russian leadership, with memories of Munich and the League of Nations, would he take the position he takes at this meeting tonight?

Mr. Denny: I'm afraid that's a very "iffy" question and I'd rather not bother to try to answer an "iffy" question, so don't give us

that kind. We've got plenty of very good questions. The young man down here, please. Right over here.

Man: Mr. Makin. Since Article 27 requires the concurring votes of the permanent members, can a great power abstain from voting without that constituting a veto?

Ambassador Makin: No, if it is a major power which abstains from voting, it does constitute equivalent to a veto.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Man in the third row here.

Man: My question is directed to Mr. Stevenson. If four of the Big Five agree to abolish the veto and one leaves, why does this mean break up of the United Nations?

Mr. Stevenson: Well, it means the collapse of the United Nations as we understand it.

If you lose the adherence of one of the five great powers on whom the peace and security of the world depends, I think you can hardly call it the United Nations. To be sure, it could become a defensive concert of powers of some kind, which we'd hope to better after this war.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. The gentleman to the right there. Yes?

Man: I address my question to Mr. Fischer. Sir, since the Russians, rationally or irrationally, fear capitalist ganging-up on the U.S.S.R., doesn't insistence on abolition of the veto lend credence

to that belief and endanger peace? (*Applause.*)

Mr. Fischer: It's long been a conviction of mine that the Soviet Government has been acting as it has not because it's afraid, but because it's not afraid. If it were afraid, it wouldn't be behaving in this aggressive manner. So, I do not think that you can go on that assumption because if that is the fear of the Soviet Government—the fear that it will be outvoted, the fear that there will be action against it—then you are sure in advance that you will not have unanimity. You are sure in advance that you are not going to take any steps under the San Francisco charter. Then, you might as well know in advance that the U.N. is ineffective. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Mr. Fischer. The young man in the back of the hall.

Man: I address my question to Mr. Schuman. Since you feel that it is such a good thing that we can't change any of these clauses in the United Nations charter, how would you intend to cope with a crisis such as the one Mr. Fischer or Mr. Makin referred to?

Dr. Schuman: There is no way to cope with a crisis in relationships among the great powers of our world save by striving earnestly, sincerely, and if need be, desperately, for a common basis of agreement, a common program of action between them. There is no

formula, there is no machinery, there is no veto or abolition of a veto that can keep this world at peace if the Big Three of the world are unable to reconcile their differences.

The supposition of the San Francisco charter is that the great powers will act together. The charter works and the U.N. organization works to the degree to which they act together. I'm sure most of you know that I do not share Mr. Fischer's implied view that the Soviet Union is primarily responsible for failure to act together. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Dr. Schuman. Will you please talk in the direction of the microphone? That's what all these gestures mean. (*Laughter.*) Don't even face us, face over there.

Man: As a fellow member of the British Commonwealth, what is your idea about the statement Mr. Smuts made today—

Mr. Denny: I'm sorry, we don't know what statement Mr. Smuts made. Don't ask questions that involve a lot of knowledge of other things. Let's have another question for Mr. Makin. The gentleman up here. Yes?

Man: I want to address this question to Mr. Makin. Mr. Makin, do you think that any consideration of this question can be carried out without first considering a solution of the atomic energy question?

Ambassador Makin: Already that matter has been the subject of considerable negotiation and consultation. I think that we are approaching that situation where we might be able to effect treaties in regard to the matter of the control of that particular form of atomic energy.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Next question.

Man: Why must we fuss to hold onto a veto, when all we need, is to have the Big Four sign on the dotted line for the Atlantic Charter, and there'd be no more trouble. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Stevenson: We thought we had done pretty well to get them to sign on the dotted line for the United Nations. I think you're asking a little more now.

Mr. Denny: The gentleman there, please.

Man: I have a question for Mr. Fischer. With the abolition of the veto, would you favor some formula attaching greater weight to the votes of the larger powers?

Mr. Fischer: Yes, I think there would have to be weightage in the voting of the Great Powers.

Mr. Denny: Thank you very much, Mr. Fischer. Now, while Ambassador Makin and Mr. Stevenson prepare their summaries for tonight's discussion, here's an announcement about next week's program.

Announcer: Town Meeting listeners will recall with pleasure

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the fact that America's Town Meeting was twice winner of the famous George Foster Peabody award, the only program to achieve this distinction. These awards are made through the School of Journalism at the University of Georgia.

Next week at the invitation of the University of Georgia, Town Meeting will originate on the campus of the University in Athens, Georgia, and will present a discussion of a topic of vital interest to every American, "How Can We Avoid Another Depression?"

United States Senator Owen Brewster of the State of Maine and Governor Ellis Arnall of the State of Georgia will be our principal speakers. Our special interrogators will be Joseph Borkin, formerly chief economic advisor and attorney in the antitrust division of the Department of Justice, and James L. Wick, author and economist. Now, for the summaries of tonight's question, "Should the Veto Be Abolished in the United Nations?" here's our moderator, Mr. Denny.

Mr. Denny: And here's Mr. Adlai Stevenson with a summary for the negative.

Mr. Stevenson: The choice, as I see it, Mr. Denny, at present is between an organization of all great powers or dividing the world into two parts, with war as the probable result. The great powers

have the ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of peace. If they cannot work together successfully, the peace of the whole world will be endangered.

The unanimity rule—what you call the veto—is designed to insure that within the United Nations, they will work together on important matters that relate to peace and security. Their unanimity is, therefore, extremely important. It is essential to the success of the United Nations at this stage. But their responsibility imposes on them duties, among them, the duty to use their special power with restraint. They must do that. They must work out within the terms of Article 27, ways to permit the Council to operate more effectively than it has done so far. This is possible. I am confident that this can and will be done. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Mr. Stevenson. Now His Excellency, the Ambassador from Australia, Mr. Makin, with a final word for the affirmative.

Ambassador Makin: I am sure that you will be convinced that no one feels very proud about the veto, and furthermore, I feel that in respect to this situation that those who are possessed of the spirit of maintaining the peace, the desire to conform to the rules of law, those who wish to serve humanity, those who desire to see

that peace shall prevail in this world, are surely capable of reconciling their differences in a spirit of confidence, good will, and conciliation.

As far as the veto is concerned, it can lead to absolute frustration. That has been written right across the whole of this discussion tonight, and I feel more convinced than ever, as I come and make this contact with this tremendous audience, and knowing, furthermore, the growing feeling among those of the United Nations, that there is an insistence that this power shall only be used in those circumstances that deal with the question of enforcement.

Therefore, I feel that we are more than justified in challenging the circumstance in the way in which the veto is used today. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Mr. Makin, Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Fischer, and Dr. Schuman. We hope that this discussion will prove profitable to the people of this nation, as well as to the delegates of the General Assembly, who have been our guests here in person and over the air.

Now our committee of judges informs me that tonight's winning question of the \$25 U. S. Savings Bond goes to an unnamed person,* who I hope will identify himself, who asks this question, "Do you think that any consideration of this question can be carried out, without first considering the solution of the atomic energy question?" Congratulations.

*Mr. Stanley R. Strauss of New York City.



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